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Abstract 
Fundamental questions remain about the practical value and generalizability of accident causation 
frameworks for explaining construction accidents.  Relevant causality literature is reviewed;  three research 
projects compared and implications of accident causation theories for accident investigation and analysis 
discussed, particularly for accidents with differing consequences and in different national contexts.  The 
effectiveness of UK accident causality framework ConAC (Construction Accident Causality) in identifying 
occupational accident causes in different industry contexts (Australia and the USA) is evaluated; and the 
implications of the choice of theoretical framework in the analysis of construction accident causation 
considered.  The ConAC framework was developed from a real-time analysis of 100 relatively minor 
construction accidents.  The Australian study used this framework to analyse the National Coroners reports 
of 258 construction fatalities and the USA study used it to develop research instruments for interviews 
regarding 27 construction accidents of varying consequences. The results suggest that the ConAC 
framework is helpful for the analysis of the causes of accidents with outcomes of differing severity.  The 
studies also suggest that it has international applicability despite differing occupational health and safety 
legislative contexts and industrial arrangements. Furthermore, significant learning can be obtained from 
considering underlying causes of accidents. 
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Introduction 
 
Accident causation 
Workplace safety improvements are shaped by knowledge and assumptions about how accidents happen. 
“What causes workplace accidents?” has been a burning question across the world, particularly in the 
construction industry in which accident rates remain high relative to other industries (see, for example, 
Safework Australia, 2012). Understanding how accidents occur is important in order to distinguish between 
factors that are relevant and require some action, and factors that are unimportant and can be ignored 
(Swuste, 2008). However, many national accident surveillance systems do not capture sufficient information 
to be used effectively for prevention purposes. For example, a broad classification of compensation claims 
by ‘mechanism (e.g., ‘struck by moving object, fall from height etc.) and agency of injury (e.g. mobile plant 
or transport) does not help us to understand the way in which an accident event ‘unfolded,’ the range of 
causal factors involved or the interplay between these causal factors (Cooke et al., 2011). Without this 
knowledge, the ability to develop appropriate prevention initiatives is fraught with difficulty.   
 
In an attempt to advance a better understanding of the causes of accidents many writers have developed 
accident causation models or theories about how accidents happen. Accident causation models “represent, 
classify and efficiently organize” safety-related knowledge and provide a theoretical framework for the 
investigation of incidents and the identification of hazards present in a workplace (Arboleda and Abraham, 
p.274-275). Hollnagel (2002) describes accident causation models as a common frame of reference 
representing an unspoken but commonly held view of the way accidents happen. Hollnagel (2002) goes on 
to argue that accident causation models are helpful because they make communication and understanding 
more efficient. The practical usefulness of different accident causation models has been the subject of much 
debate and discussion (see, for example, Lehto and Salvendy, 1991).   
 
The ability of ‘generic’ accident causation theories to explain accidents in different industrial contexts has 
been questioned as researchers have shown that accident causes vary substantially between industries 
(Williamson et al., 1996). Consequently, a number of construction industry-specific accident causation 
models have been developed in recent years. These models incorporate organizational and technological 
characteristics that have been empirically linked to project safety performance, such as client/owner’s 
procurement approach (see, for example Huang and Hinze, 2006) and the design of the permanent structure 
(see, for example, Behm, 2005). The difference between the causal links in organizational or system 
incidents and occupational incidents has also been argued.  Much of the work by researchers such as Reason 
(1990, 2006) focusses on organizational incidents that typically link closely to systemic failures.  The 
difference between these two types was highlighted in the Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf of 
Mexico, where an occupational health and safety audit had declared the project site to be performing 
excellently, at the same time as there were significant failings in the process safety elements which then led 
to disastrous consequences with multiple deaths and very significant environmental impacts (Bly, 2010).  
This paper focusses on occupational accidents and incidents in the construction sector. 
 
Questions have also been raised about the extent to which fatal and non-fatal occupational accidents share 
the same causes. It has long been conventional wisdom in work health and safety discourse that the 
occurrence of accidents can be represented as a triangle. For every fatal accident that occurs, there are many 
more non-fatal accidental injuries, and even more near-miss events (Heinrich, 1931). The ‘accident pyramid’ 
representation implies that accidents have similar causes irrespective of their outcomes. However, Salminen 
et al. (1992) analysed the causes of industrial accidents (some in the construction industry) and reported 
significantly different causes for accidents with fatal compared to non-fatal outcomes.  Similarly, Li and Bai 
(2008) report substantial differences in the cause and circumstances surrounding fatal and non-fatal injury 
accidents in highway construction zones.  Furthermore, Gilbertson et al (2011) argue that catastrophic 
accidents in construction also have different root causes. 
 
Finally, there is emerging empirical evidence to suggest that the causes of accidents vary from country to 
country. Even within the UK, Cameron et al. (2008) report different causes of work accidents in the 
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construction industries of England and Scotland due to differences in industry structure and the labour 
market in these countries. 
 
Thus there remain fundamental questions about the practical usefulness and generalizability of accident 
causation frameworks and models for explaining accidents in the construction industry and, in particular, 
their ability to identify and expose the causal roots of the accidents further away from the incident itself. 
 
Aim  
The purpose of this comparative study was to examine the extent that a holistic framework could explain the 
way that causal pathways to accidents occur (in a variety of different severity types and context settings, i.e. 
countries), particularly to identify and explore factors further away from the incident. The accident causation 
framework (The ConAC framework) being considered was developed specifically for the construction 
industry through research funded by the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE).  This work aimed to 
evaluate the need for a systematic and holistic approach to understanding accident causality. The intention 
was not to compare the importance of each cause in these types or settings statistically. Consequently, the 
relative levels of importance of each causal factor in the three settings are not the focus of this paper. 
 
The ConAC framework was developed by Haslam et al. (2003) based on a study of 100 mostly fairly minor 
construction accidents, categorizing causal factors as immediate accident circumstances, shaping factors and 
originating influences. In the United States of America, Behm and Schneller (2013) used the ConAC 
framework to analyse the causes of 27 construction accidents of varying degrees of severity.  In Australia, 
Cooke and Lingard (2011) used the same framework to analyse the causes of fatal accidents in an analysis of 
coronial investigation reports. In this paper, data from the original ConAC study are combined with the 
findings of Behm and Schneller (2013) and Cooke and Lingard (2011) with the objectives of: 
1. assessing the ConAC framework’s value in identifying the causes of fatal and non-fatal accidents; 
2. assessing the ConAC framework’s value in identifying accident causes in different industry contexts 
(e.g. Australia and the USA); and  
3. considering the implications of the choice of theoretical framework in the analysis of construction 
accident causation. 
The following section covers relevant literature of causality before comparing the three research projects and 
then discussing the implications of accident causation theories for practice of accident investigation and 
analysis. 
 
Accident causation models and frameworks 
Katsakiori et al. (2009) classify accident models into three groups as follows: 
 sequential accident models, which describe an accident as a sequence of events in a specific order; 
 human information processing models, which describe accidents in terms of human behaviour and 
actions; and 
 systemic accident models, which include organizational and management factors and describe the 
performance of the whole system. 
 
Sequential models are simple linear ‘cause-effect’ models that describe an accident as a sequence of events 
that occurred in a specific order, such as the ‘domino model’ (Heinrich, 1931). An injury was seen as the 
logical conclusion of a sequence of events that commenced with a person’s ancestry and social environment 
and culminated with a loss-producing incident. This model was updated by Bird and Loftus (1976) by 
incorporating the role of management in the accident process. Thus, all losses, whether they manifest in 
bodily injury, illness or property damage, are traced back to a lack of management control. More recently, 
Svenson (1991) developed the Accident, Evolution and Barrier model in which accidents are viewed as the 
end product of a sequence of individual ‘barrier’ failures. Sequential models have been criticized for 
focusing too much attention on the immediate circumstances surrounding an accident (Hopkins 1995) and 
failing to reflect the complex interaction of multiple causes in industrial accidents (Hollnagel, 2002; Goh et 
al., 2010). 
 
Human information processing models explain accidents in terms of human behaviour and actions. Gordon 
et al. (2005) suggest that many accident reporting and analysis methods lack a firm framework for 
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psychological and human factors. Following a review of accident causation theories and reporting systems, 
they developed a Human Factors Investigation Tool (HFIT). The HFIT model organizes accident causes into 
four categories: (i) the behaviours immediately prior to the accident or action errors; (ii) a reduced level of 
situation awareness that produced the action error; (iii) threats to safety emanating from the work 
environment that reduce situation awareness; and (iv) behavioural responses and detection cues that permit a 
recovery from error before an accident occurs.  
 
Systemic accident causation models highlight the dynamic interaction between organizational and cultural 
factors in creating the conditions in which a precipitating event can result in a major incident. James 
Reason’s ‘Swiss Cheese’ model is a widely cited model of this type. According to Reason (1990, 1997), 
accidents are caused by a complex interaction of latent conditions and active failures. Active failures are 
immediate observable causes, similar to Heinrich’s (1931) unsafe acts or conditions. These can be easily 
identified. Also, latent conditions may also be present in work systems. In a sense these are ‘accidents 
waiting to happen’ and can include poor design, low levels of training, a mismatch between levels of 
competence and responsibility and other systemic deficiencies. Over time, work systems build up defences 
against these latent conditions. However, in local workplaces, latent conditions combine with human factors 
to result in human errors or violations - unsafe acts committed at the human-system interface. Reason 
suggests that many unsafe acts occur, but few result in accidents because systems have in-built defences, 
likened to layers of Swiss cheese. However, there are holes in these barriers which vary in size over time. 
Should a situation arise in which the holes ‘line up’, the system’s defences fail and errors result in 
organizational accidents. Rasmussen et al. (1994) describe how the objectives constraints inherent in a work 
system, such as financial imperatives and workload demands and functional and safety requirements create 
boundaries of acceptable behaviour. In Rasmussen’s model, pressures for production efficiency combine 
with a natural human tendency to seek ways of working that require the expenditure of less effort 
encouraging workers to “migrate” towards the boundary of acceptable performance. Safety programs 
establish a boundary of safe behaviour (within that which is functionally acceptable). Continual pressures to 
work close to the boundary indicate that, so far as possible, systems of work should be designed to be error 
tolerant. 
 
Construction accident causation  
Historical research on accidents in the construction industry concentrated on the analysis of data derived 
from existing (often compensation-based) accident reporting schemes, (see, for example, Culver, 1993; 
Hinze and Russell, 1995; Hunting et al., 1994; Kisner and Fosbroke, 1994; and Snashall, 1990).  This 
approach was limited by incomplete and/or poor quality data. For example, Daniels and Marlow (2005) 
suggest that the level of reporting of non-fatal construction injuries in the UK construction industry is as low 
as 46%. Studies by BOMEL (2001) and Gyi et al. (1999) revealed the quality of accident data collected by 
construction companies to be poor, limiting the ability for systematic analysis and identification of causes. 
The majority of early analyses of construction accident causation focused heavily on workers behaviours 
and attributes and the immediate surrounding circumstances of an accident. For example, Hinze (1996) 
identified worker distraction as a causal factor and Abdelhamid and Everett (2000) reported training, 
attitudes and work procedures to be the predominant causes of construction accidents. Whittington et al. 
(1992) identified construction company headquarters, the worksite and individual workers to be the source 
of accident causes in the ratio of approximately 1:2:1.  
 
Suraji et al. (2001) developed a model of risk factors for accidents in construction operations, distinguishing 
between problems with workers’ actions, site conditions and construction practices (proximal causes), and 
linking these to project, contractor and process management influences (distal causes).  The role played by 
distal factors is now well recognized in the analysis of construction accidents. For example, Priemus and Ale 
(2010) use James Reason’s model to explain how the systemic failure of barriers at the design, construction, 
permitting, inspection and use stages of the Bos and Lommerplein estate project in Amsterdam, resulted in 
serious structural safety problems. Manu et al. (2010) similarly refer to proximal and distal factors in their 
development of a method by which to analyse the extent to which various construction project 
characteristics contribute to accidents. These characteristics include the nature of the project, the method of 
construction, the extent of physical site restrictions, project duration, design complexity, the extent and 
nature of subcontracting arrangements, the procurement system and the level of construction (high or low 
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rise). Manu et al (2010) suggest that many of these characteristics can be traced back to the clients’ brief, 
design decisions and project management decisions. 
 
Building on the work of Rasmussen, Mitropoulos et al. (2005) developed a systemic model of construction 
accident causation, which posits that the construction activity and context characteristics combine to create 
hazardous conditions. At the same time, production pressures elicit efficient work behaviours. However, 
when efficient work behaviour and hazardous situations coincide workers are exposed to hazards. According 
to Mitropoulos et al. (2005), hazard exposures can be mitigated by workers’ efforts to control conditions 
and/or a tendency for competent action. When hazard exposure coincides with human error and/or changed 
conditions the potential for an accident is present. The incorporation of construction activity and context 
characteristics, which include task unpredictability, is helpful in understanding construction accidents 
because they reflect the constantly changing construction site environment.  
 
Hale et al. (2012) adapted a Human Factors Analysis and Classification Scheme (HFACS), previously used 
in the aviation industry, to analyse the causes of construction fatalities. The HFACS framework adapted for 
construction classifies unsafe acts according to whether they are deliberate (violations) or errors and further 
subdivides each of these classifications. Thus deliberate unsafe acts can be routine, situational or exceptional 
and errors can be rule-based, knowledge-based or skill-based. The framework identified preconditions that 
could give rise to these unsafe acts, as well as organizational and environmental influences which give rise 
to these preconditions. HFACS framework was then used in in-depth interviews with government health and 
safety inspectors to explore the causes of fatal accidents. The framework was found to be particularly useful 
in improving accident investigators’ consideration of human and organizational factors. Garret and Teizer 
(2009) also developed a construction safety error analysis, educational, and classification tool.   
 
The ConAC Framework 
The hierarchical ConAC framework of construction accident causality was developed as part of a three- year 
study by a research team based at Loughborough University in 2003 based on a study of 100 construction 
accidents (Haslam et al, 2003 and Gibb et al, 2006). The research team used the information obtained from 
people involved in selected incidents, including the victims and their supervisors, to describe the processes 
of accident causation in construction. The resulting model, depicted in Figure 1, identified originating 
influences affecting incidents in construction as including client requirements, features of the economic 
climate, the prevailing  level of construction education, design of the permanent works, project management 
issues, construction processes and the prevailing safety culture and risk management approach. For example, 
the analysis of the 100 incidents suggested that more than half could have been prevented with alternative 
design solutions. Deficiencies in the risk management system were also apparent in almost all of the 100 
incidents studied, which represents a significant management failure. Project management failures were also 
commonly reported, most of which involved inadequate attention to coordinating the work of different 
trades and managing subcontractors to ensure that workers on site had the requisite skills to perform the 
work safely. The next level of contributing causes identified in the ConAC framework is termed “Shaping 
factors” which include issues, such as the level of supervision provided, site constraints, housekeeping and 
the state of workers’ health and fatigue. Poor communication within work teams was also identified as an 
important shaping factor.  The most immediate circumstances in the ConAC framework are the suitability, 
usability and condition of tools and materials, the behaviour, motivation and capabilities of individual 
workers and features of the physical site environment, such as layout, lighting and weather conditions. 
While it is important to identify these immediate circumstances, the model acknowledges that construction 
incidents occur as a result of a complex process, involving proximal, as well as distal causes, many of which 
originate “upstream” of the construction site. 
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Figure 1: The ‘ConAC’ accident causation framework (Haslam et al., 2003) 
 
 
Methods 
 
Original ConAC framework development 
The 100 ConCA construction accidents were studied in ‘real-time’ through a combination of interviews, 
focus groups, site visits, photographs and observations.  Working closely with construction organizations, 
the team was advised when an accident had occurred.  A researcher attended the accident location as soon as 
possible (often the following day) to make observations and to interview anyone involved in the incident and 
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also other relevant site-based personnel.  This initial study was evaluated by an expert panel and suitable 
avenues for follow-up were identified to investigate distal causal links.  These included people such as 
designers, planners, head-office personnel and suppliers, and, where appropriate, relevant documentation 
was also studied.  A necessary limitation of this study was that the accidents should not be ones that were 
being investigated by the authorities.  This was to prevent witnesses being advised not to discuss the incident 
for fear of legal action.  This worked well in that people were willing to discuss issues surrounding the 
accidents, but it also meant that the majority of the accidents would normally have been classed as minor, 
resulting in relatively low consequences.  A separate exercise sought to evaluate the likelihood of the 
outcomes being more serious had certain key factors been different.  Further detail is provided in Haslam et 
al. (2003). 
 
Study 1 – Australian analysis of coronial findings (Cooke & Lingard, 2011) 
The National Coronial Information System (NCIS) is an Australian database that allows the storage and 
retrieval of every death investigated by an Australian coroner since July 2000, (January 2001 for 
Queensland). The NCIS database was searched to identify occupational accidents resulting in death in the 
Australian construction industry. Criteria for inclusion in the analysis were: (i) the decedent must have been 
a construction industry worker; and (ii) the accident resulting in death must have occurred while the 
decedent was at work, thus incidents in which the decedent was travelling to or from work were excluded. A 
total of 258 cases occurring between 2000 and 2010 were identified using these search terms and criteria. 
Next, thematic content analysis of coroners’ findings was undertaken to code the causes of incidents that led 
to the deaths. Data were coded according to the categories of Immediate Causes, Shaping Factors and 
Originating Influences identified in the ConAC causation framework (Haslam et al., 2003). The analysis was 
a deductive process commencing with an identification of the immediate circumstances of the incident, e.g. 
the tools and materials involved, workers’ behaviour and site conditions and environment. Shaping factors 
and then originating influences were identified wherever possible from the coroner’s reports. This analysis 
did not assume any sequential links between immediate circumstances, shaping factors and originating 
influences. Thus, relevant contributing factors at each level of the ConAC framework were identified 
independently of those identified at the other levels. No attempt was made to link immediate circumstances 
with the shaping factors that preceded them, or link shaping factors with particular originating influences. 
 
Study 2 – USA analysis of non-fatal construction accidents (Behm and Schneller, 2013) 
In the USA, Behm and Schneller investigated 27 construction accidents utilizing the ConAC framework as a 
guide during the investigation process, which included interviews with various employees, supervisors, 
managers, and safety representatives (Behm & Schneller, 2013).  A variety of incidents were investigated.  
Thirteen of the incidents investigated (45%) resulted in lost time ranging from one to 35 days, with an 
average of 5.7 lost work days.  Ten of incidents investigated (38%) resulted in medical only cases. The 
database contained four near misses (15%). No fatalities were investigated.  Operational definitions were 
created for the 22 causes/factors/influences contained within the ConAC framework and these were used to 
code the interview data. The analysis assumed a sequential link between relevant contributing factors 
identified at each level. Thus, it was assumed that immediate circumstances were causally linked to shaping 
factors, which were, in turn, causally linked to originating influences.  
 
Limitations 
The ConAC framework was developed inductively from the original studies of the 100 UK accidents.  The 
two subsequent research teams applied the ConAC model independently of each other and at different times. 
In their respective individual publications (Cooke & Lingard, 2001 and Behm & Schneller, 2013) their 
methodology was detailed and actions taken to ensure validity and reliability of their data was reported and 
documented. The three data collection settings cannot be duplicated to test inter-rater reliability or to use 
statistics such as Kappa.  This is acknowledged as a limitation to this paper, however, the intent is to 
synthesize the three applications of the ConAC framework, not provide an additional check and balance of 
the three independent research applications. 
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Results 
 
Comparison of accident causes 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of factors categorized as immediate circumstances in the ConAC framework 
in all three datasets (i.e., the original UK data, the Australian coronial findings and the US interview data). It 
is important to note that there are multiple causal links in all the incidents and so the numbers do not sum to 
100%.  There were some similarities and some differences between the three datasets. In the original ConAC 
analysis, the top three ranked immediate circumstances were suitability of materials or equipment (n=56), 
workers actions/behaviour (n=49), and workers’ capabilities (n=42). In comparison, in the Australian 
analysis, the top three ranked immediate circumstances were workers’ actions/behaviour (n=137), site 
layout/space (n=87) and suitability of materials or equipment (n=73). In the US analysis the top three ranked 
immediate circumstances were workers’ actions/behaviour (n=17), workers’ capabilities (n=16) and local 
hazards (n=13).  The UK emphasis on materials or equipment may be because the UK incidents mainly only 
had first aid consequences.  Furthermore, the primary UK researcher had a human factors background where 
the consideration of the role of tools and equipment is more likely than for construction safety researchers 
(e.g. Vedder & Carey, 2005 and Gibb et al., 2005).  The high top score for workers actions/behaviour in the 
Australian case may be influenced by the fact that this study was a re-review of coroner’s reports where 
there is often a tendency to ‘blame the worker’ (e.g. Kouabenan et al., 2001 and Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998).  
It is also noteworthy that workers’ capabilities was one of the least frequently identified immediate 
circumstances in the Australian analysis, identified as being relevant in only 11 cases. Local hazards were 
identified often in the US data compared with the UK and Australia data. In the US, the model was applied 
to Department of Transportation accidents where local hazards such as overhead power lines, rocks beneath 
soil, and steep embankments were abundant. 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of immediate circumstances identified in the original Loughborough University 
study and the subsequent Australian and US studies. 
 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of factors categorized as shaping factors in the ConAC framework in all 
three datasets (i.e., the original UK data, the Australian coronial findings and the US interview data). Again, 
there were some similarities and some differences between the three datasets. In the original ConAC 
analysis the top three ranked shaping factors were worker attitudes and motivations (n=49), design or 
specification of materials or equipment (n=45) and workers’ knowledge and skills (n=42), with site 
constraints slightly lower (n=35). In the Australian analysis, the top three ranked shaping factors were 
workers’ knowledge and skills (n=53), design or specification of equipment and materials (n=53) and site 
constraints (n=44), with supervision a very close fourth (n-42). In the US analysis, the top three ranked 
shaping factors were workers’ knowledge and skills (n=16), workers’ attitudes and motivation (n=12) and 
site constraints (n=11).  
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Figure 3: Distribution of shaping factors identified in the original Loughborough University study and 
the subsequent Australian and USA studies. 
 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of factors categorized as originating influences in the ConAC Framework in 
all three datasets (i.e. the original UK data, the Australian coronial findings and the US interview data). In 
the original ConAC analysis the top three ranked originating influences were risk management (n=84), 
permanent works design (n=27) and project management (n=24). In the Australian analysis the top three 
ranked originating influences were risk management (n=54), construction processes (n=30) and safety 
culture (n=28). In the US, the top three ranked originating influences were risk management (n=18), project 
management (n=12) and permanent works design (n=8).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of originating influences identified in the original Loughborough University 
study and the subsequent Australian and US studies. 
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Table 1 gives the average number of originating influences, shaping factors and immediate circumstances 
identified per accident in the three sets of data. The lowest number of originating influences per accident 
was identified in the Australian dataset (an average of 0.61 per accident).  The US dataset yielded the 
highest number of originating influences per accident (an average of 1.89 per accident). The US study had 
the benefit of utilizing the model created from the UK study and interviewing numerous people in contrast 
to the Australian study.  In all datasets, more immediate circumstances were identified per accident than 
were shaping factors or originating influences. The  relationship between the number of contributing factors 
identified per accident and distance from the accident showed a linear inverse relationship in the Australian 
dataset, in both the US and UK, a greater number of originating influences were identified per accident than 
shaping factors. 
 
Table 1:  Number of factors identified per accident in the original Loughborough University study 
and the subsequent Australian and USA studies 
ConCA Categories  Countries  
 UK Australia USA 
Immediate 
Circumstances 
2.47 1.82 3.00 
Shaping Factors 0.69 1.07 1.74 
Originating 
Influences 
1.35 0,61 1.89 
 
Additional insight provided by the ConAC Framework 
Table 2 shows the number of times each of the causal/contributing factors identified in the ConAC 
framework was explicitly identified as a factor in the Australian coronial findings (column 2). This is 
compared with the number of times each causal/contributing factor was identified when the coronial reports 
were re-analysed using the ConAC framework as a guide. As can be seen, for most of the 
causal/contributing factors, the use of the framework led to more instances of this cause/contributing factor 
being identified in the coronial findings and supporting documents (e.g. police reports etc). Further, the 
more removed from the accident the causal/contributing factor, the greater the difference between the 
frequency with which the factor was identified explicitly in the coroner’s report and the frequency with 
which it was identified in a subsequent analysis based upon the ConAC framework. Thus, the average 
increase in frequency of identification of immediate circumstances was 92%, compared to an average 
increase of 188% for shaping factors and 245% for originating influences.  However, this is not surprising 
given the legal imperative behind the coroners’ reports. 
 
Table 2: The number of times each causal/contributing factor was identified explicitly in the coronial 
findings and in a secondary analysis of relevant case information using the ‘ConAC Framework’ 
(n=258 cases) 
 
Cause/contributing factor classification 
Number of 
times the 
factor was 
recorded 
explicitly 
in the 
coroners’ 
findings 
Additional 
times the factor 
was identified 
as being 
relevant when 
using the 
‘ConAC’ 
Framework 
Per cent 
increase 
Im
m
ed
ia
te
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ir
cu
m
st
an
ce
s Worker actions/behaviour                             64 73 114 
Worker capabilities (including new knowledge/skills) 5 6 120 
Communication                                        11 10 91 
Site layout/space                                    30 50 167 
Working environment (lighting/noise/hot/cold/wet)    8 5 63 
Site conditions (excluding equipment and materials)  0 0 0 
Local Hazards                                        7 12 171 
Condition of materials or equipment                  7 7 100 
Usability of materials or equipment                  2 0 0 
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Suitability of materials or equipment                38 35 92 
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Attitudes and Motivations                            8 11 138 
Knowledge/skills                                     23 30 130 
Immediate supervision                                18 24 133 
Worker health/fatigue                                0 2 NA 
Housekeeping                                         2 3 150 
Work scheduling                                      2 5 250 
Site constraints                                     9 35 389 
Design                                               12 38 317 
Specification                                        3 0 0 
Supply/availability                                  0 2 NA 
O
ri
g
in
at
in
g
 i
n
fl
u
en
ce
s Permanent works design                               4 13 325 
Project management                                   4 7 175 
Construction processes                               6 24 400 
Safety culture                                       8 20 250 
Risk management                                      14 40 286 
Client requirements                                  2 5 250 
Construction education                               11 3 27 
Economic climate                                     0 1 NA 
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Discussion 
 
Applicability of the ConAC Framework 
The results suggest that the ConAC construction accident causation framework can be used to analyse the 
causes of accidents resulting in outcomes of different levels of severity. The framework was initially 
developed using interview data exploring the causes of minor (mostly first aid only) accidents.  However, 
the majority of contributing factors reflected in the framework were identified as relevant to a greater or 
lesser extent in the analysis of causes of more serious non-fatal and fatal accidents. Further, in all three 
datasets immediate circumstances, shaping factors and originating influences could be identified for many of 
the accidents. The relevance of the framework to the causes of accidents in construction industries in both 
Australia and the USA also suggests that it has international applicability. It is noteworthy that the USA and 
Australia have significantly different occupational health and safety legislative frameworks and industrial 
arrangements (Lingard, 2012), but this study suggests that the causal relationships are not significantly 
affected.  
 
In Brazil, Filho et al. (2012) analysed organizational factors utilizing the terminology from the original 
research (Haslam et al., 2005) that underpinned the development of the ConAC framework.  They focused 
on fall accidents during residential apartment construction and found they could trace risk reduction 
deficiencies to organizational influences including design decisions and project planning and 
management.  Their work reinforces the utility of the ConAC framework and the importance of investigating 
upstream activities.  
 
What-you-look-for-is-what-you-find 
Hollnagel (2002) comments that one disadvantage associated with accident causation models is that a single 
point of view is strongly favoured and alternative explanations may not be considered. Lundberg et al. 
(2009) raised the issue of WYLFIWYF (‘What-You-Look-For-Is-What-You-Find), arguing that the models 
used in any investigation are going to heavily influence the outcome.  It is therefore logical to assume that, 
where people have only looked for immediate accident causes, then that is what they will find.   
 
This research results support the WYLFIWYF principle. It is noteworthy that fewer originating influences 
per accident were identified in the Australian dataset compared to the US or UK datasets. The Australian 
analysis utilized a secondary source (coronial findings and associated documents) which were contained in a 
national database. There was considerable variation in the depth or analysis of coronial findings and data 
capture and reporting practices varied widely between Australian states and territories. The coronial 
investigations and subsequent reports that were produced were not informed by the ConAC framework and 
there was no opportunity for researchers to interview the accident investigators or the people directly 
involved in the accidents. In contrast, the UK and US studies were interview-based and researchers had the 
opportunity to explore the relevance of distal causes. The US researcher used the ConAC framework to 
guide his interviews with people who had been personally involved in the incident, their supervisors and 
managers, those who had witnessed the workplace accident, and the organization’s safety professional. 
Thus, the US researcher was actively ‘looking for’ the ConAC factors. The WYLFIWYF principle is also 
supported by the fact that, when the Australian researchers’ reviewed all of the documents contained in the 
NCIS database pertaining to the identified construction work-related deaths, they were able to identify 
substantially more contributing factors than were identified in the coronial findings themselves.  It is 
possible that were a systemic accident causation model, such as the ConAC framework, to be used to inform 
investigations, a more comprehensive range of contributing factors could be identified enabling more robust 
accident prevention strategies. Further, the use of a consistent accident causation model could overcome 
problems associated with accident data quality and coding. 
 
The value of the ConAC Framework 
By necessity, many accident causation models and frameworks have been derived from relatively small 
sample sizes such that influences factors including consequence severity, industry sector, project-type, 
national context, investigation protocols are not able to be taken into consideration.  The more popular 
models then tend to be used, sometimes inappropriately, outside of their initial context.  For example, 
Reason comments that “enthusiastic use [of the Swiss Cheese model] sometimes relied on interpretations of 
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the model’s semantics that went rather far beyond what was initially intended” (Reason et al., 2006).  
Svenson et al. (1999) argue that accident investigators from different professional backgrounds will come to 
different conclusions as they will interpret the ‘facts’ from their own theoretical perspectives.  They go on to 
say that “experts with different basic professional training should perform accident analyses jointly and not 
in sequence or in parallel. Contrary to this view, this current exercise has demonstrated the value of a pre-
existent causal framework to inform the investigation process. 
 
A significant reason for investigating accidents is to learn from past mistakes and reduce the incidence of 
future accidents (Lindberg et al., 2010; Chua and Goh, 2004), hence the benefit of exploring contributing 
factors further up the causal chain.  However, often, accident investigations only concentrate on the 
immediate circumstances, due to the need to prosecute offenders or limitations in time and resources for the 
investigation.  Seasoned accident researcher James Reason argues that the “definition of a root cause is the 
contributing factor that you were working on when the money or time runs out” (Reason et al., 2006). The 
results of the US and Australian studies presented here suggest the value of the ConAC framework to 
construction accident investigators, particularly in exploring ‘distal’ causes which may not be immediately 
obvious. Using the ConAC framework, the Australian researchers were able to identify more factors 
contributing to fatal construction accidents than were identified in existing coronial investigation reports. 
Also, the number of additional contributing factors that could be identified using the ConAC framework 
increased proportionally with distance from the accident. Thus, proportionally fewer additional immediate 
circumstances were identified than shaping factors or originating influences. This suggests that 
investigations tend to focus on immediate circumstances but may not adequately identify ‘blunt end’ 
contributing factors. Mitropoulos et al. (2005) comment that most accident investigations focus on 
immediate circumstances because their purpose is to assign blame rather than support learning lessons for 
prevention. Similarly, Hale et al. (2012) note the tension between enforcement and the need to learn from 
accidents for prevention purposes.  
 
There are, of course, problems with moving further away from the circumstances immediate to the accident 
and focusing on more distal factors.  In his seminal work on major, catastrophic accidents, Reason revised 
his terminology between the first ‘Swiss Cheese Model’ (1990 p.208), which spoke of latent errors or 
failures, to latent conditions (Reason et al., 2006).  He writes “A condition is not a cause, but it is necessary 
for a causal factor to have an impact.  Oxygen is a necessary condition for fire; but its cause is a source of 
ignition” (Reason et al., 2006).  Thus, apportioning blame, particularly within a legal framework is 
significantly different from establishing a causal link. The combined research results suggest that the 
ConAC framework is useful for establishing ‘distal’ factors that contributed to an accident but it would be 
problematic and inappropriate to use the model to attribute blame. Accident investigations have the benefit 
of hindsight; those who consider hindsight as always being equivalent to reasonably foreseen are mistaken.  
The fundamental purpose of accident investigations is for organizational learning (Lindberg et al., 2010); 
Sklet, 2004).  Notwithstanding, such a model could also be used in targeting initiatives for improving health 
and safety performance. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has shown how a generic framework developed in the UK from a real-time analysis of 100 
relatively minor construction accidents was used in the analysis of Australian National Coroners reports of 
258 construction fatalities and the study of 27 construction accidents of varying consequences in the USA. 
 
The results suggest that the ConAC framework can help to analyse the causes of accidents resulting in 
outcomes of different levels of severity.  The framework was initially developed using interview data 
exploring the causes of minor (mostly first aid only) accidents.  However, in all three datasets immediate 
circumstances, shaping factors and originating influences could be identified for many of the accidents.  The 
distribution of factors within these groupings was not consistent across the three settings, but each group 
was clearly represented.  The ConAC framework allows investigators to question conditions throughout the 
lifecycle of typical construction projects, from the sharp end on site to the underlying distal factors.  The 
framework allows investigators to learn about conditions and potential risk countermeasures that should be 
considered in an overall construction safety and health management system.  The research synthesis shows 
that similar conditions, as outlined in the ConAC framework, exist for a variety of construction accidents 
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with a variety of outcomes from near misses to fatalities.  This challenges some current theory in that these 
findings are counter to that of previously published research findings reporting that fatalities and minor 
injuries have different causes.  We contend that the ConAC framework’s terminology is sufficiently 
generalizable and because it focuses on conditions rather than mechanism or agency of injury, it can be 
applied to a variety of construction accident consequences and yield numerous organizational learning 
opportunities at both the sharp end on site and the blunt end of project management or design.  
 
The relevance of the ConAC framework to the causes of accidents in construction industries in both 
Australia and the USA also suggests that it has international applicability, despite the differences in the 
occupational health and safety legislative contexts and industrial arrangements in the different countries. 
 
The findings show that significant learning can be obtained from considering underlying causes of accidents 
to reduce the incidence of future accidents.  Most current incident investigation protocols concentrate on 
immediate accident circumstances rather than exploring contributing factors further up the causal chain, 
often due to the need to prosecute offenders or limitations in time and resources for the investigation.  The 
authors have argued in support of the WYLFIWYF concept (What You Look For Is What You Find) which 
can potentially limit the increased understanding of underlying root causes of accidents if the search for 
causes does not go beyond immediate circumstances. Although not every construction accident investigation 
will reveal contributing factors up the causal chain, we contend that, in practice, when investigations of 
construction accidents do not reveal any shaping factors or originating influences, the investigation should 
be scrutinized.  The authors acknowledge however that the WYLFIWYF concept also challenges the 
assertions of this work in that it would suggest that if you look for distal causes then you will find them. 
 
There was agreement between the three data sets when considering circumstances immediately surrounding 
the incidents.  However, the more removed from the accident the causal/contributing factor, the greater the 
difference between the frequency with which the factor was identified explicitly in the coroner’s reports and 
the US study. 
 
The implications of these findings are that, in order to understand better the complex multi-causal links in 
construction accidents, organisations and governments should be encouraged to investigate beyond the 
immediate circumstances.  The combined research results suggest that a causal framework such as ConCA is 
useful for establishing ‘distal’ factors that contributed to an accident, despite is comparative complexity.  
However, it would be problematic and inappropriate to use the framework to attribute blame or as the basis 
for prosecution.  Further research into applications of causality frameworks beyond the context on which 
they are based is required to explore this aspect more fully.  The Australian application of the ConAC model 
attempted to identify the outer Originating Influences of client requirements, economic climate, and 
construction education whereas the original model development and the US application did not 
quantitatively capture these distal factors. We encourage construction researchers and practitioners to 
consider these important antecedents and the complex nature of construction industry relationships when 
seeking to understand occupational safety and health in the built environment. 
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